### AT: Prolif Slow

#### \*\*Domino theory is true – your authors agree.

Asal and Beardsley, Department of Political Science at Emory and Department of Political Science at the State University of New York, 2009 (Kyle and Victor, Journal of Conflict Resolution, April, p.297, NOTE: This is the last paragraph of this article)

The findings here importantly suggest an additional reason why “proliferation begets proliferation,” in the words of George Shultz (1984, 18). If both parties to a crisis have nuclear weapons, the advantage is effectively cancelled out. When states develop nuclear weapons, doing so may encourage their rivals to also proliferate for fear of being exploited by the shifting bargaining positions. And once the rivals proliferate, the initial proliferator no longer has much bargaining advantage. On one hand, this dynamic adds some restraint to initial proliferation within a rivalry relationship: states fear that their arsenal will encourage their rivals to pursue nuclear weapons, which will leave them no better off (Davis 1993; Cirincione 2007). On the other hand, once proliferation has occurred, all other states that are likely to experience coercive bargaining with the new nuclear state will also want nuclear weapons. The rate of proliferation has the potential to accelerate because the desire to posses the “equalizer” will increase as the number of nuclear powers slowly rises.

### AT: No ME War

#### Russel is beter – short flight times, historic tensions

### AT: Will buy from other sources

#### SMRs best – Sanders – cheapest and can go where other reactors can’t – current 123 agreements prove they like it enough

### AT: Won’t Push Nuclear Leadership

#### Loudermilk is just better – US has a strong commitment to nuke leadership – all ev about 123 agreements prove

#### Concede the other internal link – SMRs themselves are prolif proof

### AT: Nuke Power Down

#### **\*\*Nuclear development is inevitable even under conservative estimates – most complete data**

WNN 2012 (September 26, “Nuclear growth slowing not stalling” <http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-Nuclear_growth_slowing_not_stalling-2609127.html>)

Growth rates may have slowed but world nuclear energy capacity will nevertheless continue to increase over the coming decades, according to the latest projections from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

When IAEA director general Yukiya Amano referred to the findings of the 32nd edition of the IAEA's annually updated Reference Data Series No. 1 in his address to the agency's 56th General Conference in Vienna recently, he noted that although the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident raised "fundamental questions" on nuclear's future, the atom will remain an important option for many countries, with developing countries continuing to show a keen interest in nuclear power.

The newly released report - full title Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates for the Period up to 2050 - contains high and low projections of energy, electricity and nuclear power trends over the coming years. Under the low scenario, installed nuclear capacity is predicted to grow from 2011's 370 GWe to reach 456 GWe by 2030, about 9% down on the increase projected in 2011. A ten-year delay in growth anticipated before the Fukushima accident is observed, with nuclear capacity taking until 2030 to reach levels that had previously been anticipated for 2020.

The high scenario predicts nuclear capacity reaching 740 GWe by 2040. Projected growth is strongest in the east Asia, including China and South Korea, where regional capacity is forecast to grow from 80 GWe at the end of 2011 to 153 GWe in 2030 in the low scenario and 274 GWe in the high scenario. Growth is expected in all regions of the world under the high scenario, although total Western European nuclear capacity could decline from 115 GWe in 2011 to 70 GWe in 2030 under the low scenario. The low scenario also sees a slight decrease for nuclear capacity in North America.

The figures on nuclear are based on actual statistical data collected by the IAEA, with country-by-country estimates of future nuclear capacity established by a group of experts using a 'bottom up' approach. All possible licence renewals, planned shutdowns and plausible construction projects are taken into consideration. The conservative low scenario assumes the continuation of current trends and few unexpected policy changes, although it is compatible with a potential decline in nuclear's share of Japan's electricity mix. The more optimistic high scenario assumes that current global financial and economic crises are overcome relatively soon and global policies are implemented to mitigate climate change. Both scenarios are plausible and technically feasible, the IAEA maintains.

The report recognises the on-going global financial crisis, the low price of natural gas and reduced electricity demand in some regions, in addition to responses to Fukushima, as challenges that will serve to temporarily delay the deployment of some nuclear power plants. Eighteen months on from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident there is still uncertainty about the full extent of the effects of individual policy responses to regional projections. Nevertheless, the report says, the "underlying fundamentals of population growth and demand for electricity in the developing world," coupled with concerns over climate change, energy security and price volatility for other fuels, "continue to point to nuclear generating capacity playing an important role in the energy mix in the longer term."

### AT: China Impact

#### \*\*Relations are useless – don’t make China more cooperative

TKACIK 2003 – RESEARCH FELLOW CHINA POLICY @ HERITAGE, HERITAGE MEMORANDUM #907, NEEDED: A REALISTIC LOOK AT CHINA POLICY, 12-2

In 2003, China has renewed threats of war against Taiwan, dragged its feet in the war on terrorism, lent moral support to North Korea's nuclear program, continued proliferating dangerous weapons, accelerated its military buildup, been increasingly aggressive in the South China Sea, and cultivated an ever-worsening human rights environment. The Administration and Congress should reexamine their China policy and reconsider why they abandoned the candid, firm, and successful pre-September 11 approach for a policy of conciliation and compromise, which has yielded little beyond rhetoric.

#### Romney will just use threats to leverage concessions

White, 9/15 (Ben, 9/15/2012, “Doubts grow on Mitt Romney’s China threats,” <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0912/81254.html>)

Romney hopes his tougher words will make Obama look weak. But the question remains whether Romney’s tough talk is just that: talk.

“It’s kind of a head scratcher,” said the senior financial services executive who supports Romney but questions his China policy. “Is this just rhetoric or is this really the view of the candidate?”

Other executives see Romney’s tough stance as a head fake to the Chinese, an opening gambit that will give him leverage once he takes office. This view holds that Romney can score an early win with the Chinese by wresting certain concessions in return for not labeling the country a currency manipulator or taking other actions right away.

#### China won’t retaliate --- not in its self interest

Bosco, 9/6 --- senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, was China country director in the office of the secretary of defense from 2005 to 2006 (Joseph A., “China and a Mitt Romney presidency,” washingtonpost.com/opinions/china-and-a-mitt-romney-presidency/2012/09/06/32917432-f76f-11e1-a93b-7185e3f88849\_story.html)

In his Sept. 3 op-ed column, “A foreign policy choice,” Jackson Diehl wrote that a President Romney “will surely drop his threats to start a trade war with China, just as [George W.] Bush and Bill Clinton did.”

First, it takes two to wage a “trade war.” When China realizes that Mr. Romney is serious about declaring it a currency manipulator (which it is), wiser counsel may well prevail in Beijing. Playing by international rules is far more in China’s interest than is retaliating against free and fair trade. China could avoid the choice between dangerous escalation and embarrassing submission by preemptively starting to free its currency before a Romney inauguration.

Second, U.S.-China relations encompass far more than trade: China’s terrible human rights record at home; its support for murderous regimes in Damascus and elsewhere; its proliferation of nuclear and missile technology, and enabling of North Korea’s programs; its increasingly aggressive actions in the East China and South China seas; and its ongoing military threat against Taiwan.

A President Romney will surely continue the diplomatic pivot/rebalancing to Asia begun by President George W. Bush and accelerated by President Obama and, one hopes, will back the rhetoric with military resources.